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Abstract 
Game theory solutions may find the sufficient balance point to
develop decisions in many cases, however, we usually face
situations in which, due to the great number and difficulty of
factors influencing the circumstances, game theory solutions
show more balance points. This makes the selection of the right
decision more difficult, or in a worse case, they cannot find
solutions (which are difficult to write down with the use of
mathematical relations) among the circumstances. Therefore,
during processing the relevant literature, I emphasized the
introduction of the classic and the new approach of the relations
of economic value and sustainability, because the interpretation
of sustainability still carries many difficulties which cause the
practical implementation to be hardly achieved. Many think that
the key of interpreting sustainability is to be able to conceptualize
the criteria-system and requirements of sustainability through
function-like relations, as well. The mathematical interpretation
of sustainability factors, the introduction of sustainable economic
balance or company strategies through a game theory approach,
and interpreting the search for classic and sustainable economic
balance points are challenges for which many theories, scientific
papers, generative formulas and a great number of scientific
attempts have been connected for decades now, but none of them
has been fully successful.
Keywords
game theory, cooperative games, non-cooperative games,
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1. Introduction
Economics basically states that rational behavior is based on
consistent preferences. If a person’s preferences satisfy some
basic needs or consistence-criteria, then these preferences can
correspond to a well-defined usefulness function. Therefore,
rational behavior can be viewed as the maximization of the
usefulness function. This leads to the fact that we can call this
definition of rational behavior the usefulness theory, says
Harsányi (1995a).
However, Harsányi also states that there is much evidence that
this hypothesis is not valid, and that economics is rather based on
the hypothesis that the preferences of people are completely
consistent (1995). Most economists view this as a useful and
simplifying hypothesis, arguing that economics, which is built
upon this hypothesis, can offer mostly good, even if not perfect
forecasts of the machinations of the economic system.
Economic policy argues about how the happenings of economy
affect the behavior of society. To prove that this is a basic part of
everyday life, e.g. the fact that the average family size has been
in decline in most countries in the last few decades, is well-based
proof. The reason for this is that the economic pros of a larger
family were greatly diminished while the cost was heightened
due to the effects of urbanization and intensive technological
advancement. The preference of a smaller family model and the
consumption and living standards of families consisting of 3-4
people therefore took an important role in the process of optimum
search (Hobson, 2012).
In order to link not only decision aspects based on economic
indexes, but actual factors that have an impact on living standards
to the choice preferences of various families, e.g. the criteria
system of their purchases, we have to aim at creating a
comparison method which can be used for many different
attributes that aren’t dependent on each other (Vincze, 2009). If
in the course of our decisions we have to form a judgment on a
system or an object based on more characteristics simultaneously
and these characteristics mean a mostly controversial
characteristic set, while the sorting principles being connected to
this show complicated contexts, then we may turn to
mathematical modeling and its software applications for help.
Therefore, to start the examination of the multipurpose systems,
we should assign the most important criteria. We have to accept
that fact at the time of the optimization of more opportunities,
that according to Axelrod (1984) we can’t optimize all
characteristics taken into consideration simultaneously. The
simple reason for this is that the optimum of the attribute-
representing objective functions usually won’t correspond to the
same alternative all the time.
2. Method
We can generally say about the designation of the criteria system
that we cannot take each single characteristic that influences our
system or the function of its examined object into consideration.
That is why we have to select those that are worth the additional
investigation from the essential characteristics. The various
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characteristics have to be totally independent of each other. This
is very important during the course of the selection in order to
have no overlaps between the single criteria, since these cross
characteristics may cause unnecessary examinations and a loss
of time during the analysis. Therefore, during the multipurpose
optimization tasks, we may have the following tasks in order for
the process of the model creation, and the criteria system of
problem solution to take shape (Forgó et al., 2005):
1. Designation of criteria system (and also, major attribute sets)
2. Independence analysis of attribute sets (avoiding overlaps
between attributes)
3. Designation of choice variables and parameters in attribute
sets (deterministic, or stochastic – in other words, realized
with some level of probability – marking)
4. Designation of binding criteria related to set (creation of sets)
5. Designation of possible criteria of the criteria system, and
the number of objective functions in set (the number of
objective functions is finite)
6. Search of optimum for objective functions 
The general form of the multi-purpose programming task
according to Molnár et. al. (2010a) is as follows (if we assume
that D (φk) = L and in case of any X∈, φk (X) is a real number):
X∈L
φk (X )→max         (k=1,2,…..,n)
X – system of choice variables 
L – possible set of values for choice variables 
D (φk) – choice domain of function 
n – number of objective functions 
φk = k – th objective function, in other words, the payoff function
We have to note, however, that the need for multipurpose
problem solving is not the requirement of the present, since János
Neumann already laid down the function-like necessities of the
behaviors attached to rational decisions in 1928, and, in his work
written together with Oskar Morgenstern entitled „Game Theory
and economic behavior,” wrote it down in detail already in 1944
(Neumann – Morgenstern, 2007).
3. Results
Search for points of equilibrium in non-cooperative games
Game Theory fundamentally deals with the solution of
multipurpose problems, that is, with so-called strategic games.
Game Theory is one of the branches of mathematics with an
interdisciplinary character and it primarily tries to tackle the
question of what is rational behavior in situations where the
possible choices of the participants influence the result of the
decisions of all participants. A problem or problem solution can
be called a strategic game if the decision makers may have
influence on the outcome of the game between the existing
conditions and the framework of rules (Mező, 2011a).
We always assume that we may characterize the outcome of
the game for all players with an objective function in Game
Theory solutions, in other words, the payoff function already
mentioned. And for the various players (characters), the bigger
the payoff function value, the more beneficial the outcome of the
game is. The players' decisions, in other words, the outcome of
the decisions onto the final result, are what we call the player’s
strategy. We know two- or multi-person variants of Game Theory
solutions. The Game Theory solution is non-cooperative if the
players or characters compete with each other during problem
solving, while the game is obviously cooperative if cooperation
takes shape between the players. The importance of searching for
points of equilibrium is emphasized in Game Theory. If the search
aims at the fact that, when including all players’ strategies, the
benefit of one player won’t change in case of him changing his
strategy and none of the other players do so either, we call it the
Nash equilibrium (Szidarovszky – Molnár, 1986).
The theory of the Nash equilibrium originates from John Nash,
who was rewarded with a Nobel-prize for the development of the
theory at the same time as János Harsányi, exactly 20 years ago.
It was shown through Nash’s equilibrium theory that all finite
games have at least one point of equilibrium. Nash divided the
optimization games into cooperative and non-cooperative types.
According to his thesis, the cooperative game is the kind where
cooperation between players is simply enforced. According to
him, we can only talk of non-cooperative games if agreement
between the players is impossible to enforce. A non-cooperative
game in the case of various strategies of players can only be called
stable if the so-called Nash equilibrium is present. In the case of
Nash equilibrium, the strategies of the various players are the
optimal replies to the others’ strategies, so there aren’t any players
who want to break this status quo by choosing new, different
cooperative strategies. The game will not be stable if it is not in
the Nash equilibrium point, because there is always at least one
player in this case to whom his strategy does not mean the best
answer in the given situation, and therefore he will be interested
in looking for a new strategy for himself (Harsányi, 1995b). 
As I’ve already mentioned, the equilibrium situation may also
be stable in case of cooperative games if one of the strategic
combinations isn’t in accordance with the rest of the strategies,
because the strategic cooperation will sooner or later be enforced.
However, in economic life we mostly face strategy creations that
do not take each other into consideration and run beside each
other or that do not take the multipurpose decision process or the
designation of choice optimum into consideration (Molnár –
Kelecsényi, 2009). From the European or economic policy
practice, we have a good example for this: the bulk of strategies
concerning environment protection or renewable energetic
developments, since we often face a strategy creation with a
contradictory direction here. 
A principle is that developments with an environment
protection aim have an opposite direction to that of the priority
system of economic development (f. e. the program taking aim
at the reduction of greenhouse gas and fossil energy use takes aim
at the minimization of the intake, while the other one at the
increase of a polluter energy source). A good example for this is
two of the EU's main strategies: EU Low-carbon Roadmap 2050
vs. Nuclear Power in France (2014). 58 nuclear power plants
operate currently in France, and additional developments are
going on, while Germany just decided that by 2020, all (now 8
operating plants) of them will be shut down. 
In case of cooperative games, the selected strategy may also
be stable even if a strategy combination is not in Nash equilibrium
but the players come to an agreement that this strategy
combination will be selected. During the course of the
presentation of this search dilemma for the Nash equilibrium
point – in case of non-cooperative games - I lean fundamentally
on István Mező’s study (2011b), „Game Theory,” while if I differ
from this, I’ll note it separately in the description.
Definition 1: 
According to the Definition of the Nash equilibrium:
The point of equilibrium or strategy for an n player 
game is a point (strategic n), for which
holds true for every i=1,…..,n player. The point of equilibrium is
therefore called a Nash equilibrium. [Shortened: 
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1.1
where k = 1,2,...n ].
If 1.1.’s equality is strict, then it is called a strict equality. 
If we do not state anything else, we say it’s the point of
equilibrium is non-strict. 
The i-th player can maximize his own payoff if he plays the
equilibrium strategy, namely,     if all the other players do the
same. We will need the following definitions to find the state of
equilibrium:  
Definition 2:
An n- player J game is called a constant sum if the rewards and
demerits earned by the player is a constant c value, regardless of
strategy. 
With formula: 
If c = 0, the game is called zero sum game. 
Two-player, zero sum games are useful for demonstrating the
definition of the point of equilibrium better. If we take a  point of
equilibrium, based on (1.1) 
and
The game is zero sum, therefore: 
and:
If we rearrange the formula:
and including (1.2) inequality as well, we get: 
This inequality system states that from a          point of
equilibrium, if player one leaves with a strategy different from 
, the payoff function can only be either lower or equal. If
player two is the one who leaves, the payoff function of player
one will either be greater or equal, and since the game is zero
sum, this would mean that his „payment” won’t be greater. 
Definition 3:
Let’s look at two games, which only differ in payoff functions: 
J and J' are called strategically equivalent, if there’s a positive
number, and there are bi numbers,where i=1,….,n), that 
The following thesis describes the obvious fact, which is also
clear on the basis of simple intuition and logic that strategically
equivalent games must always be played in the exact same
manner.  
Thesis 1: 
The points of equilibrium for strategically equivalent games are
the same. 
Proof: Let
be our strategically equivalent games, and let 
be one of the points of equilibrium for game J. According to the
definition for point of equilibrium (1.1), at i-th player’s every
xi∈Si strategy:
Since J' is strategically equivalent to J, then with the constants
a >0 and bi:
which, due to being positive results in 
And this means                       is a point of equilibrium for J'. 
Thesis 2: 
For every constant sum game, there is a zero sum game that is
strategically equivalent to it, therefore having an overlap in points
of equilibrium.
Proof: Let us simply subtract the constant sum from the value
of payoff functions. This results in a zero sum in every possible
outcome, and the new game remains strategically equivalent to
the old one. Because of our previous thesis, their points of
equilibrium are also the same. If we look at constant sum games,
it’s enough for us to only concern ourselves with the zero sum
variants only. Furthermore, a two-player game is zero sum if one
player wins exactly as much as the other one loses (or the
opposite). Therefore: 
we can use this function, and we don’t actually need a payoff
function altogether, we simply use φ – instead of e.g. φ1. 
Theoretical correspondences of finite games
If an n – player game’s Sk (k=1,2,…..n)  strategy sets are finite,
then we say the game is of a finite kind. Games of a finite kind
can typically be either two-player or n – player, meaning more
than two players. In the function-like correspondence system of
games of finite kind, it can be made obvious that during the
solution of multi-purpose problems, the strategic sets, in other
words, the defined parameters, or criteria groups are finite, but
are always more than two. Since the project development decision
process of our analyzed problem, the investments related to
environmental defense and renewable energetic developments is
n – player (n ≥2), it’s advisable for us to analyze the behavior of
multi-person games (Szidarovszky et. al 2013). We do assume
however, that the game isn’t concluded in a mere moment, but at
previously designated t0 ,t1 ,t2,….. times, where only one player
can modify the state of the game due to a previously set
consecution. This state can be depicted with a tree graph (refer to
Figure 1). This process in search of optimum is quite similar to a
3×3×3 Rubik’s Cube’s solution process alternatives, since we
56
1.2
decide by the cube’s randomness, in other words, unsortedness,
which shortest combination row (or depth level) we choose to
heighten the level of sortedness, or simply, the solution of the
cube in the case of layer by layer solution method (G. Nagy,
2008).
Figure 1. Decision tree graph with pre-determined times 
(t0 , t1 , t2 , t3) and combination alternatives (K1 , K2 , K3)
Source: self-made (based on MIEA, 2005)
The state of the system made by the players, in other words,
the multi-purpose problem solving, can be illustrated with a
problem tree, or tree graph, however, let’s assume (according to
Forgó et al. 1999) that:
a) the tree has a starting point (state of t0 time, which goes
towards t1 , t2….., n),
b)one player is assigned to the starting point and every
branching point in accordance with a previously defined rule;
this player can choose between the various, finite number of
edges, and relocates the system’s state from this edge’s
starting point to the conclusion point, 
c) every player knows the game’s current progress in every tk
(k ≥ 0) time point, including all the states of the game up to it, 
d) in all the conclusion points of the tree diagram, all players
have a payoff function value known to them.
Furthermore, let’s assume that there are no players assigned to
some of the peak points of the tree graph and the progression from
here happens randomly through predetermined distributions,
meaning the players don’t have choices, or do, but only
symbolically. For the sake of uniformity, let’s assign a player to
these peak points as well, but their decisions are merely formal.
In this case, the payoff functions of the game should be replaced
with anticipatory values based on the random distributions. This
game can be illustrated with a finite tree graph and is called a
perfect information extensive-form game (Molnár - Szidarovszky,
1995; Molnár 1994). 
Thesis 3: 
Every perfect information extensive-form game that can be
depicted with a tree graph has at least one point of equilibrium. 
Proof: Let I mark the starting point of the tree graph, while V1 ,
V2 ,…..VM marks the conclusion points. In our tree graph’s case,
there is a single route leading from I to every Vk conclusion point.
The length of the longest route is called the tree graph’s length.
We will prove the thesis with the complete induction of the game’s
tree graph’s length, according to Molnár and Szidarovszky
(2011a). 
If h(F)=0, then the tree graph only consists of the starting point.
This means that players only have a single strategy. Furthermore,
in this case, this single strategy is obviously the point of
equilibrium. Let’s say that h(F) ≥ 1. Let m mark the number of
edges originating from the starting point, and let U1 ,U2 ,……,Um
be the conclusion points of the edges originating from the starting
point. Furthermore, let Fk (k = 1,2,…,m) mark the maximum part-
graph with the Uk starting point, excluding the I peak point. It is
obvious that Fk’s conclusion points are from F’s points. Let 
mark the original game narrowed to Fk , meaning that to  Fk’s peak
points, we assign players also assigned to them in F, and to its
conclusion points, we assign the payoff function values of F. 
In this case, it’s obvious that h(Fk) < h(F), therefore, according
to our induction thesis, Γk games have 
existing points of equilibrium. Let us say that in the game of
graph F, we assigned player i0 to the starting point. 
a) Let us assume that player i0 can freely decide between the m
routes originating from the starting points. In this case, it’s
obvious that if i ≠ i0 then 
Therefore, player i0, apart from advancement in graph Fk, has
to decide the advancement from the starting point as well. Let
φi0 mark (x(k)*) numbers’ highest index, where the strategic n
bundle obviously offers the point of equilibrium for the game,
in case of Γk (1 ≤ k ≤ m) games’ x(k)* points of equilibrium,
supplemented by advancement from starting point I to point
Uk0.
b)Let us assume that player i0 randomly makes a choice at the
start of the game from a pre-determined p1 , p2 ,…..,pm
probability distribution. In this case, the Cartesian product of
Γk games’ x(k)* points of equilibrium gives the original game’s
point of equilibrium. To prove this, let’s say that in case of k =
1,2,…,m and i=1,2,…,n:
with arbitrary xi(k) ∈ Si(k), multiplying the inequality by pk and
in case of k = 1,2,…,m, we obtain the inequality defining the
point of equilibrium for the original game by addition. 
The thesis was proven based on Molnár – Szidarovszky
(2011b), who stressed during the proof that the multipurpose
problem solving is primarily suitable for the solution of smaller
tasks, in other words, forming short tree graphs. Here, we get
games that can be depicted with zero length tree graphs, in case
of which staying in their only point means the only point of
equilibrium. However, the number of the short tree graphs may
grow so much in case of bigger tasks that it makes searching for
points of equilibrium impossible. This can be recognized with
experimentation – trial and error. 
Games of infinite kind – Game Theory models with one or more
points of equilibrium 
Games with a single point of equilibrium
The simplification of the points of equilibrium for any given
game can be proven by e.g. proving the problem of one of the
exact fixed point-problems, which is equivalent to the problem
of equilibrium. During the proof, I basically follow
Szidarovszky’s logical process, while if I differ from this, I’ll note
it separately in the description. 
A single-variable, fixed point problem usually means the
solution of the f(x) = x equation. It is a known fact that if f is a
decreasing function of x, there can be no more than one solution.
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Let’s try to generalize this monotonization criteria to a multi-
dimension case. Therefore, let f be a vector-variable, vector-value
function, f : Rn —> Rn . The following example shows that strict
monotony by component still won’t guarantee exactness
(Szidarovszky, 1978a).
Example. Let’s look at the
x = - x - 2 y
y = - 2x - y
fixed point-problem, given by
imaging. Both components in both their variables are strictly
decreasing functions, and yet there are an infinite number of fixed
points: 
y – x.
We can show however, that a different type of monotony is
sufficient to prove the exactness of fixed points. 
Definition. Let D  ⊆ Rn be a convex set. We call an f: DgRn
function monotone, if for any x, y ∈ D :
(x – y)T(f(x) – f(y))≥0.
function f is called strictly monotone, if for any x,y ∈ D  and x ≠ y: 
(x – y)T(f(x) – f(y))>0.
We can easily see that if f is monotone, the imaging cannot
have two different fixed points. Let us assume in spite of this that
x and y are both fixed points.
0 < (x – y)T(x – y) = (x – y)T(f(x) – f(y))
=  -(x – y)T((-f(x)) – (-f(y)))≤0, 
This is obviously a contradiction.
We can easily check the monotony of the imaging, as shown
by the next thesis: 
Thesis. Let D ⊆ Rn be a convex set and f: DgRn function
continuously differentiable. Let J(x) mark f ’s Jacobi matrix at
point x.
a) If J(x) + JT(x) is positive semi-definite in all x ∈ D  points, f
is monotone,
b) If J(x) + JT (x) is positive definite in all x ∈ D points, f is
strictly monotone. 
Proof. 
For a fixed x, y ∈ D, let’s introduce the
g(t) = f( y + t(x - y))
scalar variable function. Obviously
g(0) = f(y) and g(l) = f(x),
therefore
Let’s multiply both sides from the left by the (x – y)T linear
vector, and we get:
In the previous step, we used the fact that for any given 
u ∈ D·Rn vector and n x n type J matrix: 
uT Ju = uTJTu,
since both sides are scalar, and each other’s transposes. If J + JT
is positive semi-definite, the right side isn’t negative, and if it’s
positive definite, then it’s positive, respectively. Having precise
knowledge about imaging is an absolute necessity to use the
results above, which isn’t always possible, due to the need for
knowledge on solving optimum-problems. This is why results
which are based on the attributes of strategic sets and payoff
functions are very important (Molnár – Szidarovszky, 2011c;
Mészáros, 2005).
Two-player games of an infinite kind: biomass-management 
Let’s take a builder depot as an example, which is in contract
with a logging firm for firewood (biomass) supply. For the sake
of simplicity, I’ll only include one type of firewood, meaning one
type of product. According to our hypothesis, the distribution of
the purchases arriving to the builder depot is exponential, meaning
it’s a question of incoming needs per timeframe (Molnár –
Szidarovszky, 1995):
g (x)= αe-αx (α>0,x>0).
To understand the example, we will be using the following: a1
is the total profit from selling one unit of product, meaning
firewood, if it supplies from its own stock. a2 will be the total
profit of the builder depot, which comes from purchased firewood
(a2 < a1). b1 will be the deposit cost of the builder depot per unit.
b2 will be the logging firm’s deposit cost per unit. 
The strategies of both the builder depot and the logging firm
can be described by one number: the size of their stock. If y marks
the builder depot’s stock while z marks that of the logging firm,
then the builder depot’s anticipatory profit is as follows: 
The first part of the formula refers to when need is lower than
y, then the building depot can cover it from its own stock. In this
case, his profit per unit is a1. The second part refers to when y+z
≥ x ≥ y. In this case, the building depot covers y amount from its
own stock, and the remaining x – y need is covered by purchase.
The third part refers to when x > y + z, where the building depot
can’t cover all needs from its own stock, therefore, it satisfies y
from its own stock, and z from purchase, namely the logging
company’s stock. The fourth part of the formula refers to the cost
of deposit. Based on the same correlation, the anticipatory profit
of the logging firm is as follows: 
With this, I defined a two-person game of infinite kind. If we
propose that y’s permissive values are y1, y2,……ym1 and z ’s
permissive values are z, z2,……zm2 , while we allow mixed
strategies as well, then we have a bimatrix game (Molnár et al.,
2010b):
Theory of cooperative games 
Primarily those market players and companies that can be defined
well on the market can already apply Game Theory solutions well
in the present practice. Game Theory mathematics, meaning the
selection of suitable strategies supported by numbers, may happen
in an exact manner. What currently doesn’t generally apply to the
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selection of appropriate strategies is the practice of cooperative
aim or strategic choice. The sustainability concepts make it
unambiguous that a production/consummation goal system can
be planned long-term if the use of resources is planned and in a
synchronized manner. Sustainable development may not be
realized without this cooperation. The cooperative attribute and
the fact that market players form coalitions provides a new
approach to the Game Theory approach, as well. This doesn’t
necessarily mean that the interests of players are the same
regarding e.g. the distribution of costs, but during the cooperation,
it is compulsory to abide by a collectively defined criteria system
(Hardin, 1968).
During cooperative strategies, the players or market players
have the natural aim of raising their profits by giving up on their
autonomy partially or completely (Solymosi, 2009). By this
method, a given group of players or all players cooperate with
each other and perhaps form coalitions or even a single coalition.
The natural requirement of the cooperation is that the
participating players or market players must have a higher share
of profits compared to those who do not take part in cooperation
at all. In this case, the goal won’t be the increase of personal
profits, but the maximization of the cooperation’s profits. This
aim completes the criteria of sustainability, in other words,
sustainable development, or economy’s weak sustainability
(Molnár – Kelecsényi, 2009).
Cooperative games will be defined with the following
descriptions. N={1,…..,n} is the set of players for which a given
S subset is commonly known as a coalition: S ⊆ N. Let S be the
set of subsets or the set of coalitions. The N base set is called
complete coalition (Szidarovszky, 1978b). 
Conflict alleviation methods
Conflict alleviation methods are one of the favored groups of
cooperative Game Theory solutions. Of these, we can stress the
importance of Nash’s axiomatic solution, which used axiom sets
to assure that the solution is always placed on the Pareto-line.
And the Kálai - Smorodinsky solution can give the last possible
point which is the achievable minimum or the solution of the
conflict by defining the worst outcome point of the conflict
(Molnar – Szidarovszky, 1994). 
Conflict alleviation methods will be demonstrated with a two-
person case. In our example, let S1 and S2 be the players’ strategy
sets, and φ1 and φ2 the two payoff functions. The set of possible
payoffs can therefore be as follows: 
In this case, as always, both players aim at maximizing their
payoffs, but their respective payoffs are naturally dependent on
the other player’s strategy, and a general rule is that raising one
player’s payoff leads to a drop in the other’s (Nowak – May,
1992). Therefore, our task is that we have to find a solution that
is acceptable to both parties. Before each solution, we have to
state that if there’s no cooperation, both parties will get either a
lower payoff, or a penalty. 
General definitions: 
this will be our payoff vector, for which we assume that there is
a (f1 , f2) ∈H, for which f1 > f1* and f2 > f2*. The conflict is defined
mathematically by the (H,f*) pair. This pair was defined in Figure
2. We will also assume that set H is closed, convex and bounded,
which therefore means that:
for which is                essential, and bounded in both coordinates,
therefore 
in case of i = 1,2.
Figure 2: Graph of conflict 
Source: based on Molnár-Szidarovszky, 2011c
Furthermore, we also assume that H’s borderline is the graph of
function f2 = g(fx), which is strictly decreasing in point f1 and
concave. The graph of function g is usually called the Pareto line,
therefore the optimum criteria for sustainability can only be
satisfied here. Between the game and solution dependencies, we
have to take note that no rational player will accept a partnership
which means a worse payoff than a payoff without any
partnerships. 
Therefore, the possible payoff set can be narrowed as such: 
H*={f1,f2│f1≥f1*,f2≥f2*,(f1,f2∈H}
Model of oligopolistic games
Oligopolistic game solutions are the most popular for the modeling
of economic decision processes. They can be used for both
cooperative and non-cooperative strategies; however, in my
dissertation, I wish to present the cooperative model to define the
sustainable maximization of the usefulness function, due to the
importance of the sustainability attribute system.
There may be two relevant problems of economic science in the
case of the usefulness function. The first problem was that the
consumers aren’t only defined by one usefulness function, but by
an unlimited number of functions, and they are equivalent to each
other. The second came up when the choice was made during
insecurity. The solutions used on oligopolistic games can
maximize the players’ usefulness functions with the highest
probability when the criteria are fixed and the strategies used are
cooperative (Simonovits, 2003; Ichiishi, 1983). 
In the wide scale of engineering (environmental protection)
tasks, we can meet with exact problems that have a mathematical
model which may be reduced to an oligopolistic game. Multi-
player Game Theory may be used to examine many variations of
problems (Szilágyi, 2005). In the following example, I’ll try to
introduce the process of optimum search based on oligopolistic
games by concentrating on a single product in the market process
(this could be, e.g. green energy on the energy market), and by
including market players and groups (manufacturers, transporters,
regulators, implementers, etc.), who have an impact on the
changes of the product’s cost, and the creation of the point of
equilibrium. 
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In case of cooperative games, giving up on independence must
result in the raise in profits for players (Simonovits, 2003). 
General definitions for cooperative games:
φk – payoff function
Sk – strategic sets (x1*,….xn*) – strategic attributes
n – a certain positive integer
k – a certain set of Sk
Condition: for =1,2,3…,n , xk* ϵ Sk, and for every given xk ϵ Sk
The inequality could be defined in words as such: for the k-th
player (1 ≤ k ≤ N), the equilibrium strategy is the optimal strategy,
assuming the other players choose the correct equilibrium strategy.
The cooperative game results in a coalition where the coalition
itself can always generate profits unlike those who are not
members. 
Maximum of cooperative game, profits of coalition: 
Let’s assume that a set M of players k makes the 
coalition. Furthermore, let us take the game defined by 
strategy sets, and
payoff functions. It is obvious that function φ ̃1 ’s „max-min”
value, meaning 
quantity – in which it exists – is only dependent on set M. The
coalition assumes that players not in the coalition aim at
minimizing the coalition’s profits. 
Example for oligopolistic problem handling:
To keep it simple, let’s assume that M=1,i1=.…=in=1, meaning we
only examine a single product, and every group consists of a single
unit. Referring to the known max-min function, f can be
differentiated into the [0,ξ] interval. Let I={i1,….ir }⊂{1,…,N} be
a coalition (Molnár – Szidarovszky, 1994). 
In this case, v(I) can be as follows: 
To calculate value v(I), first we need to calculate the
quantity. 
We differentiate two possible cases during problem solution:
1) is if ∑j∉I Lj ≥ ξ, then obviously 
2) is if ∑j∉I Lj < ξ, then obviously
In our first case, function ψ1’s maximum point is based on
functions’ Ki ’s increase, meaning xi1=,…= xir = 0, therefore,
Let’s introduce the LI = ∑i∈I Li and L ̃I = ∑j∉I Lj definitions for
our second case. 
Then, according to the formula above:
We can solve the above written equality with a programming
task. We can use dynamic programming for the numeric solution
(Molnár – Szidarovszky, 1994; Simonovits, 2003). 
Method of equal compromise 
The search for the solutions to environmental problems can be
solved in different ways, as I’ve already mentioned at the
beginning of the chapter; therefore, the optimum point, conclusion
point or solution can manifest on the Pareto line in multiple
coordinates. The method we use is dependent on the attitude of
the one who does the optimization, his beliefs, intuition, and the
nature of the processed problem (Axelrod, 1984). 
Out of all the employable conflict alleviation methods, I chose
the method of equal compromise to demonstrate the Game Theory
solution, which (in case of two players) assumes that both players
reduce their requirements at the exact same pace, to the point
where they arrive at a possible solution. One of the method’s
characteristics is that there is usually a single solution point, and
giving it outlines the optimal criteria system for the players (Forgó
et al., 2005). This means that they accept the first solution (which
is probably the best possible for both of them) as the solution to
the conflict, or conclusion point. If both players want the
maximum payoff, the (f1*, f2*) point is needed, which is not
possible. 
In case of continuously and collectively decreased requirements,
the problem’s definition (if the solution is (f1, f2), the two players
always give f1*– f1 and f2*– f2 discounts, therefore, in case of equal
discounts:
f1* – f1 = f2*–g(f1)
Transforming the equation to f1:
f1 – g(f1) + (f2*  – f1*)=0
where we see the left side strictly increasing, for f1=f1* , f1* – 
– f2*+(f2* – f1* )<0 and for f1=f1* , f1* – f2*+(f2* – f1*)>0, therefore,
there is exactly one solution for the problem (Molnár –
Szidarovszky, 1995). 
4. Conclusions and summary
My hypothesis is that the previously introduced non-cooperative
and cooperative Game Theory solutions are applicable to
mathematically defining sustainability criteria, since they allow
the determination of points of equilibrium for economic,
production, and strategic creation and planning processes, which
create a clear basis for both long-term sustainable resource usage,
and avoidance of economy development processes which have a
detrimental effect. During the control and implementation of the
Game Theory method, we refer to the „Layer by layer method,”
meaning row after row solution of Rubik’s Cube, which has the
characteristic of being applicable to modeling the process of
project development and the attributes that have an impact on each
other during the development, through the logical sequence. 
According to the hypothesis on the solution algorithms of the
Rubik’s Cube, the parts rotated next to each other, meaning the
project attributes which have an impact on each other, have a
relation system which can be defined in mathematical terms,
therefore, their point of balance (e.g. Nash’s) can also be
determined by Game Theory models (games of finite kind, zero
sum games, oligopolistic games, etc.).
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My analyses on Game Theory strategy models show that in
today’s practice, we can find a multitude of economic strategy
models that don’t really work as intended. The reason for this is
basically the over-complication of the models and the inclusion of
the multitude of factors and criteria. In order to save the process
of modeling and the actual mechanisms of the models from falling
into the category of „too complicated, no thanks,” we require a
simplified and yet correctly working model that is easy to
interpret, can be properly loaded with different data, and easy to
correct. During the analysis of the Game Theory models and the
strategic optimum search systems, I came to the conclusion that it
is more beneficial to use smaller, individual and unique Game
Theory solutions which have different reactions in a business
environment to describe the process of equilibrium search instead
of using complex multi-factor model-structures to describe the
entire process in the form of functions. In case of development
processes for renewable energy production, in other words,
advancement from fossilized to renewable energy sources, by
dividing the development program to three levels, then using non-
cooperative Game Theory method for the first, constant or zero
sum game for the second, and finally, to define output criteria,
cooperative Nash-equilibrium search with multi-player
oligopolistic game for the third, offers a more beneficial result.
The unorthodox Game Theory method I described suggests –
during the phase of actual use – that we use function characteristics
which are flexible time-wise for the various levels (input and
output), therefore, it may prove applicable to model more
complicated processes, if we form an optimum search process by
a consecutive use of many simple Game Theory models. These
methods/games can also be changed, and flexibly adapted to
different economic criteria systems, according to the changes in
business environment. 
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